For capital markets to function, political institutions must support capitalism in general and the capitalism of financial markets in particular. Yet the shape, support, and extent of capital markets are often contested in the polity. Powerful elements -from politicians to mass popular movements -have reason to change, co-opt, and remove value from capital markets. And the competing capital markets' players themselves have reason to seek rules that favor their own capital channels over those of others. How these contests are settled deeply affects the form, extent, and effectiveness of capital markets. And investigation of the primary political economy forces shaping capital markets can lead us to better understand economic, political, and legal institutions overall. Much important work has been done in recent decades on the vitality of institutions. Less well emphasized, however, is that widely-shared, deeply-held preferences, often arising from the interests and opinions that prevail at any given time, can sometimes sweep away prior institutions, establish new ones, or, less dramatically but more often, sharply alter or replace them. At crucial times, preferences can trump institutions, and how the two interact is well-illustrated by the political economy of capital markets. Since North's (1990) famous essay, academic work has focused on the importance of institutions for economic development. Here, I emphasize the channels by which immediate preferences can trump institutional structure in determining the shape and extent of capital markets.
Introduction
It is not fully obvious how and why political institutions come to support a deep, wide, well-functioning capital market. While capital owners benefit most directly from a strong capital market, many widespread interests have reason to undermine the capital market and the capital owners. The polity in a functioning democracy must come to see capital markets as benefiting the democratic majority, despite the fact that the benefit is indirect and not always vivid.
In this article, I outline the main weaknesses in the interaction between political institutions and capitalism in both developed and developing nations, illustrate this interplay with historical capital markets examples, and show how the interaction between capital markets and politics has been seen in the academic literature. I focus not on the standard and important channel of how institutions affect preferences and outcomes, but on how and when immediate preferences can trump, restructure, and even displace established institutions.
Two core afflictions affect the interaction between politics and financial markets, both emanating from capitalism's propensity to generate large pools of financial assets whose disposition and use the polity can contest. The first is that those who do not control or benefit directly from the assets, the have-nots, can use the political arena to grab financial assets that they could not obtain in the economic arena, thereby creating a pernicious contest between the haves and the have-nots. This conflict burns resources and must be settled or accommodated for the economy to progress. How it is resolved deeply affects both the shape and the extent of the capital market.
The second recurring problem is that the haves -typically the capital owners themselves, and sometimes those who control capital but do not directly own it, often have considerable political influence. They often fight among themselves in the political arena for rights to those assets. Much of the political economy of capital markets arises from varieties of these two fundamental conflicts -one between the haves and the have-nots, the other among the haves themselves.
Although it is tempting to explain the survival of long-standing financial and corporate structures as resulting from rational optimization of private goals, these structures are often just as much reactions to conflicts among capital owners or mandates from the winners. I give some examples of how conflicts among capitalists and their managers largely explain core features of the capital market for the large public firm in the United States. Other examples can be seen in Western Europe. Private, rational optimization explanations alone cannot fully explain these fundamental events that construct capital markets institutions.
When we academics see weak capital markets in a nation, or when we ask why a nation's capital market takes on a particular configuration, there is a tendency to look to explanations based on efficiency considerations and institutional capabilities. Less well highlighted, even today, are the political economy explanations that are also core to any full explanation. Look to the dominant political interests and decision makers in the society. If we do not see strong capital markets, this is often because it is not in the interest of politically decisive players to allow them to be strong. If their interests change, or their power declines, we should expect that the nation's capital markets' characteristics will change as well.
This political explanation is especially compelling in nations that have had little difficulty in building other resilient institutions. For such nations, political support for capital markets is particularly likely to be a policy choice rather than an issue of institutional capabilities.
Complications abound. Causation is bidirectional; and several economic, institutional, and political features are determined simultaneously. Few political features are fully discrete. These political, economic, and institutional determinants interact, with coalitions and multiple political forces in play. I sketch the simple stories first, and then show several of the interactions, complications, and causation reversals.
Financial markets can be seen as primarily a function of a nation's governing institutions. Considerable progress has been made in economics since North (1990) demonstrated institutions' importance. But institutions interact with preferences and, indeed, widespread deeply held preferences (emanating from immediate interests and, at times, overall ideologies) can bend, destroy, and build institutions. Here I give more emphasis than is typical to the role of preferences in constructing the institutions of financial markets.
I divide the inquiry along two major dimensions. First, what is the political economy of capitalism's financial channels for the nation's haves versus the havenots? Who prefers what financial outcome and who dominates political decision making? Second, what is the political economy of capitalist finance that divides the nation's haves? Subsidiary to each dimension, I ask how these questions play out in the world's richer nations and in the world's developing nations. Are there enough commonalities across nations to discern patterns?
I also show how this inquiry highlights the importance of attending to the interaction between institutions and immediate preferences. The former has been central in scholarship of the past few decades. Institutions are important, but they do not always fully shape preferences and interests. Immediate preferences, often emanating from immediate interests, when sufficiently powerful and sufficiently widely held, can at times wash institutions away as easily as hurricanes blow away shacks in their path. That does not happen often outside of severe crisis, but during those severe economic and political crises, preferences' and immediate interests' impact on institutions and finance can be, and have been, especially strong. Immediate, powerful, widespread preferences can then induce politicians to build the institutions that can withstand (some of) the future's fickleness. Today's institutions developed out of the preferences that dominated in the past. Tomorrow's institutions may well be as much a function of today's preferences as they are of today's institutions.
A roadmap for this piece: in section 2, I describe the concepts of how capital markets depend on political institutions and preferences. In section 3, I describe how political divisions can lead to differing capital markets outcomes in the developed world, describing conflicts between haves and have-nots, and fissures among the haves. In section 4, I develop these concepts for the developing world, looking at elites' interests, non-elites' interests, political stability, and the impact of economic inequality. In section 5, I examine several contemporary and historical examples in the developed world, including the power of labor in Europe, of managers in modern America, of populists in American history, and the forces for codetermination in mid-twentieth century Germany. In section 6, I extend and deepen the argument, showing the impact of left-to-right shifts over time and how these can be better analyzed in the academic literature. I describe overall limits to a political economy approach in section 7. Lastly, I conclude in section 8.
Concept

Capital Markets' Dependence on Political Institutions
Simply put, if a nation's polity does not support a strong capital market, that nation will not have a strong capital market. Ask whether strong capital markets are in the interest of the decisive political players -or what shape of capital markets best implements their interests -and one is likely to have a primary explanation for the shape and extent of that nation's capital market. The concept is simple, but powerful.
The Interests that Support or Denigrate Capital Markets
Capital owners typically have an interest in promoting capital markets and their supporting institutions, but other interests may not. Local interests may oppose centralized financial institutions that transfer capital in the economy, particularly if the institutions move capital away from the locality. Those with strong human capital could fear that strong capital markets would erode that human capital's value -that is, if strong, liquid capital markets are more likely than other configurations to force workplace changes that would threaten their human capital. Those without financial capital today and with poor prospects of acquiring capital in the future could prefer that the polity take capital from those who have it and use it to benefit those who do not. Capital is usually unevenly distributed in a nation, facilitating conflict between haves and have-nots. Even when income and property are more evenly distributed than is typical, economic rationality demands aggregation institutions, such as banks and securities markets, to achieve operational economies of scale. These aggregations can become vivid in the polity and attract negative attention.
Capital markets are not generic. Banks have an interest in preserving bank-based channels and in weakening securities market channels. Securities dealers and investment bankers have an interest in preserving and expanding securities markets. Dominant owners, such as wealthy families, traditionally, or, more recently, private equity firms, have interests in preserving their privileges. Owners of existing firms want access to cheap capital but prefer competitors not to have the same easy access.
Government bureaucracies can be wary of rival power centers in capital markets, or may sometimes wish to promote them as counterweights to other power centers in their society.
Those are the concepts, the following sections illustrate and reexamine and review the related literature.
Capital Markets and Financial Politics in the Developed World
Two basic political splits organize the inquiry for developed nations: (1) the contest between those who control capital and those who do not, and (2) contests among those who control capital.
3.1
Haves versus Have-nots
Private Power versus Governmental Power
A basic political economy type of "have versus have-not" conflict is between governmental authorities and private sector players who command capital. Although not usually seen as a conflict between haves and have-nots, it is indeed such a conflict -as government often seeks to obtain capital for its own spending needs or seeks to command its private sector use. In extreme form, a nondemocratic, dictatorial government could prefer to directly allocate capital itself, stifling the development of a private sector in general and of capital markets in particular, so as to thwart such markets from becoming a rival power center.
Governmental authorities can build, shape, or destroy capital markets, for their own reasons and not as tools of other interests or ideologies. Governmental authorities may wish to denigrate a rival power center, one that could seek to control the government. Governmental authorities could also be susceptible to ideologies and unstructured beliefs that capital markets just will not produce social welfare and that the government needs to direct and control capital flows to better produce wealth or justice. Finally, governmental authorities may see government action as the vanguard of economic and social development; in pursuing policies to implement their goals, they can crowd out private capital markets and thereby impede them from developing.
More standard accounts, which I address shortly, examine how interests lobby, capture government decision making, and then use captured governmental institutions for their own ends. One account does not exclude the other, but the concept in this section differs from the more standard ones. Government authorities are themselves an interest, one that is separate from those outside, in the civil society. Their own direct interests and beliefs can motivate their actions vis-à-vis capital markets. 
Power versus Populism; Business Elites versus Masses
Populism can affect financial markets and institutions, often in reaction to financial crises and poor economic results. Popular opinion may seek as much to punish financiers and their institutions as to improve the financial system's functioning, as the two -punishment and improvement -could be conflated in the popular mind. When this feature is powerful in politics, it can induce an institutionalization of anticapital rules and reaction. Then, once institutionalized, interests arise with reason to perpetuate the new rules and the resultant arrangements. Thus, even when the popular animus against finance dissipates in more normal political times, the created interests can stymie a return to the previous arrangements.
Analogously, workers could dislike capital and capital markets. Farmers may blame financial markets for their misfortunes as much as bad weather. Each group may have simple redistributional goals, or their thinking and voting may be influenced by envy.
Capital Markets versus Social Democracy
Social democracy played a central role in how capital markets developed in Western Europe after World War II. "Social democracy," as I use it here, refers to a nation committed to private property but where distributional considerations are vital, labor is typically powerful, and government action to foster economic equality is central on the political agenda.
Social democratic pressures can pressure managers to stray from capital owners' interests. For diffuse stock markets to persist, the diffuse capital owners must see their firms as managed by agents who are sufficiently loyal to shareholders to provide shareholder value. For dominant shareholders to turn their firm over to ownership in liquid stock markets and, hence, to turn the owners' operational control over to managers, they must expect that the net value of turning the firm over to managers and markets benefits them, the original owners. But if the benefits of liquidity and professional management are offset by managerial disloyalty, fewer dominant stockholders will turn their firms over to managers. For shareholders to count on this managerial loyalty, they need institutions and norms that induce loyalty to shareholders. But if a polity does not provide those institutions, or if it denigrates such norms, shareholders can obtain more value if dominant stockholders keep control of the firm. Managerial control will not ordinarily appear in these cases, and will be unstable if it does. Stock markets will not be strong in these nations, because managerial agency costs will be too high and too hard to bring down to levels acceptable to the original owners. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between labor power (quantified by union and job security rules) and the degree to which large firms have large blockholders. Greater labor power is associated with greater ownership concentration; weaker labor power is associated with more diffuse ownership. Details, sources, and background to the graphic can be found in Roe (2000 Roe ( , 2003 . Visible incentive compensation that ties managers to owners may be denigrated in a social democracy more than it is in a more conservative polity. Any resulting wealth disparity could especially demoralize lower level employees and lead them to demand further compensation for themselves. As already noted, governmental players can be less willing to provide capital market-supporting institutions, such as disclosure rules and enforcement, insider trading sanctions, and commercial courts. The social democratic authorities may see these difficulties as merely disputes among the well-to-do -disputes that the public authorities need not attend to. These private costs to owners of controlling managerial agency problems can accordingly be particularly severe in social democratic polities.
A considerable literature has developed on the primacy of institutions in property rights protection, which has obvious relevance to protection of capital market investors. Although institutions are surely important, the possibility exists that the academic literature is oversold on institutions now, while underestimating simple, basic political power. Politicians and public opinion can mold institutions.
Even in the United States, where property rights institutions are typically seen as being as strong as they can be, a Congress that wanted to attack capital markets could do so effectively. Legal institutions -constitutional, judicial, and otherwise -may not explain why that kind of an attack is unlikely to succeed as well as is commonly thought.
What may well count as much as institutions for the United States is that there is no political will for a frontal assault on US capital markets, even when capital institutions are seen as not serving the public interest, as was widely thought to be the case in the recent financial crisis. Outside of the United States, recent evidence indicates that right-leaning governments are perceived by property owners to protect their property better than left-leaning ones, and this partisanship dimension dominates institutional characteristics in explaining the degree of perceived property protection (Weymouth and Broz 2008) .
Those, then, are the major "have versus have-not" breaks affecting capital markets in developed nations.
Haves versus Haves
Vertical conflict -between the capital markets' haves and the nation's have-nots -is not the only political economy array here. There is a horizontal dimension as well, of conflict among the haves, with that conflict coming in three major varieties: conflicts between capital owners, conflicts between large firm managers and capital markets, and conflicts between controlling shareholders and capital markets.
Capital Markets' Internal Fissures: Banks versus Stock Markets
Different capital markets owners and capital markets players compete to maintain and expand their control over capital. They compete both in the market economy and in the political arena. If securities markets are weak, more capital will flow through the banking system, thereby benefiting bankers. Deposit banks have an interest in keeping securities markets weak, unless they can control securities flows themselves. The interests seek to protect themselves using the political realm. Macey and Miller (1991) showed that in the United States, deposit banks often lobbied for statebased securities laws ("blue sky" laws in the trade) that raised the costs of stock sales.
Small banks have an interest in weakening the competitive strength of big banks. In the United States, this historically took the primary form of small banks inducing political decision makers to bar the large, money-center banks from entering the small banks' local market. The result was that the small banks had local monopolies or oligopolies, and large banks lacked a nationwide deposit base. Roe (1994) emphasizes this feature of nineteenth century (and most of twentieth century) American financial history, particularly when the power of local bankers combined with populist opinion that militated against large, centralized financial institutions. With even the largest banks relatively small in relation to the economy, banks could not readily provide the financing for continent-spanning industries at the end of the nineteenth century. The consequence was that the demand and need for securities markets grew.
Intra-capital market tactical conflict can have unexpected but profound outcomes, as Langevoort (1987) shows. During the 1933 banking crisis, larger money-center banks sought to dissuade Congress from enacting deposit insurance, because they thought they would end up paying disproportionately for the insurance but not benefit much from it. Without deposit insurance, deposits would run off from smaller, country banks to the larger, more stable money-center banks. (Yes, there was a time when such large, money-center banks were seen as the most stable in the American economy.) Because they knew that Congress would insist on doing something visible during the crisis, and because they hoped to dissuade it from mandating deposit insurance, the large banks suggested and supported splitting investment from commercial banking (as they were not making much money in the securities business anyway). Congress did sever investment from commercial banking via the famous Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, as the large banks suggested. But Congress also decided nevertheless to insure banks' deposits, which the large money-center banks had opposed but which the more politically powerful small banks wanted.
Managers versus Capital Markets
Managers of large, diffusely owned firms have reason to disrupt their shareholders' capacity to aggregate their stock ownership, as aggregations will reduce managerial autonomy. Although they do not necessarily own capital themselves, managers effectively control capital in large, diffusely owned firms and they seek to maintain their control over the capital in their own firm. They seek laws that impede or bar hostile takeovers, rules that make it costly for shareholders to take large, active positions, and proxy contest rules that make it hard for shareholders to elect directors other than those supported by incumbent managers. (Corporate election contests are costly, because stockholder votes need to be solicited, corporate election contest rules have to be complied with, and publicity needs to be sought. The firm pays for the incumbents' nominees, while insurgents generally pay their own costs but must split any corporate gains they induce with all other shareholders. Free rider problems abound, deterring otherwise valuable contests.) These conflicts could be characterized alternatively as politically powerful haves (the managers) moving value into their hands (or keeping it there, if it has already moved) and away from economically well-to-do haves (capital owners) who are less politically powerful.
These managerial efforts have been significant in the United States historically and continue to be central today. Managers have successfully opposed the strongest proposals in this past decade to allow shareholders to elect directors not supported by incumbent managers. Prior outbreaks of these shareholder-power proposals in the United States, starting in the 1940s, also died after managers successfully opposed the proposals. There is a considerable literature on managerialshareholder conflict in the United States, see, for example, Berle and Means (1933) , and Jensen and Meckling (1976) . The literature on the spillover of managerial preferences and authority into the political sphere is thinner, although efforts can be found in Roe (1990 Roe ( , 1993 , Grundfest (1990) , and Bebchuk and Neeman (2010) .
Managers of fully stockholder-controlled firms could not readily turn to the polity to seek such rules initially, as their controlling shareholders would be unhappy with such managerial lobbying to stymie shareholder power. But once ownership became diffuse, perhaps because of the combined impact of American populism and the interests of small-town bankers in the nineteenth century, managers could more readily engage in such political action, free from shareholder veto.
Controlling Shareholders versus Capital Markets
Controlling shareholders have reason to maintain rules that allow them to shift value to themselves. Corporate rules affect the private benefits of control -such as the ease with which small shareholders can reverse related-party transactions between the firm and the controlling insiders, and the ease with which controlling shareholders can squeeze out minority stockholders at an unfair price. Once a player controls a public firm, it has an interest in maintaining (or expanding) its capacity to shift value to itself (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999) . In recent decades, this feature has been important to several Western European nations. 
Capital Markets and Financial Politics in the Developing World
Rudiments without Government Institutions
Before we focus on the "have versus have-not" issues in the developing worldthe setting to which we now switch -consider the developmental authorities' capital markets' programs and the basic academic understandings of what must be done. Development authorities often focus on bolstering institutions that promote financial markets, in the belief that better financial markets will lead to economic development. They seek to develop superior corporate laws, better securities laws, and better courts and other institutions to enforce financial and other contracts. Although these efforts are appropriate, the initial conditions historically required for financial markets have been simple, with political economy conditions the central prerequisite. If the developing nation is sufficiently stable politically and socially, the first steps for financial markets institutions can be taken, and often have been taken, with limited government action. Thereafter, as the financial markets develop, there will be interests that seek to institutionalize that development and push it to the next level -and who have the know-how to do so. This alternative view implicates core have versus have-not issues, as we shall see soon.
First, though, let us understand that this sequence -first social and political stability, then financial market development, and then legal consolidation -is illustrated in studies of the initial development of the world's strongest securities markets. They all show a rather weak corporate institutional environment initially, but one embedded in a sufficiently stable environment so that reputational forces could propel initial, extralegal financial market development. Related concepts of repeated games, with accompanying expectations of long timelines for repeated interaction -which generates mild but real institutional self-enforcement -are relevant here. See Greif (2006, chapter 3 and pp. 441-443) , and Scott (1987) .
Consider Bradford DeLong's (1991) famous piece on J.P. Morgan's directors. In an environment of weak corporate law (see Rock 2001) , the Morgan firm put their partners on firms' boards to offer their own reputation to protect shareholders from scurrilous or incompetent management. (And, it must be added that the Morgan partners' sitting on boards of competitors may have perhaps facilitated cartelization.) Pernicious insider dealings, or undiscovered managerial incompetence, would have cost the Morgan firm dearly, so they wagered (although weakly) that such nefarious or incompetent results would be unlikely to occur in the firms on whose boards they sat. Outside investors might not trust the firm and its inside managers, but they had more reason to trust the Morgan directors. Other investment banking firms presumably acted similarly. Miwa and Ramseyer (2002) observe an analogous reputational market at work in the nascent Japanese stock market of post-Meiji Restoration, late nineteenth century Japan. Firms sought directors with sterling reputations to warrant to smaller stockholders that the firm had, and would continue to have, fair and competent management. The reputational directors had a lot to lose socially and perhaps psychologically, so they cared what happened inside the firm. Franks et al. (2009) and Mayer (2008) demonstrate a similar process at work in Britain at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Reputations and repeat dealings supported a nascent stock market. Hard-edged, government-facilitated legal institutions came later.
The point here is not that reputational structures are a panacea, obviating the need to build supportive institutions. Rather, the point is twofold: a capital market can start developing without pre-existing strong institutional support, but it needs a stable political and social environment that makes the reputational markets valuable (and possible) to build. Once a rudimentary capital market is in place, a constituency in the nation that would support more rigorous institutions to regulate and promote capital markets begins developing.
The steps towards more rigorous institutions do not need to lead immediately to "hard" law. Stock markets' enforcement, for example, can initially be built, although again weakly, by the financial players, as Coffee (2001) and Mahoney (1997) demonstrate. They can punish miscreants by exclusion such as by delisting in stock market terms or breaking the miscreants' trading bench at medieval trading fairs, as North and Weingast (1989) show.
These private, exclusionary mechanisms were important in the development of US stock markets. public authorities act, as long as the political and social setting is sufficiently stable. Gilson et al. (2011) show this bottom-up process, starting in the market itself, has been in motion in Brazil in recent years.
Presumably such private ordering mechanisms could come forth and be effective in other nations, including developing nations today. But for many nations without sufficient political stability, such reputational and private ordering institutions are difficult or impossible to start up. Hence, those seeking to promote capital markets should have reason to inquire into the sources of political stability, a subject I examine below, and one which we will see depends, in large, on have versus have-not considerations.
Elites' Interests
The interests of a developing nation's elites are often key in pushing for, or preventing, capital market development. A nation's elites may oppose capital market development. Two selfinterested reasons could be in play. First, the elites may have satisfactory access to capital through, say, family banks or informal channels. Their grip on the polity may also allow them to stifle entry into banking, thereby keeping capital in the channels they already control. But a strong capital market could challenge the elite's monopoly status by facilitating upstart competitors' access to capital and, hence, increasing the upstarts' capacity to compete with the elites. Rajan and Zingales (2003a) analyze this channel in several contexts, in both developing and developed nations, and show how trade openness affects a nation's elites' calculations. If the nation is open to trade, then the elites' underlying businesses must compete, simultaneously making efficient allocation of capital vitally important to them and making any suppression of competition with local upstarts less valuable (because international, cross-border competition will be intense anyway). Thus, Rajan and Zingales (2003b) conclude that in opentrade countries, elites would be less likely to oppose capital market development. Elites in closed countries would have greater incentives to suppress capital market development.
For developing nations, Acemoglu et al. (2001) , Sokoloff (2002, 2005) , and Engerman et al. (2000) each indicate how land and agricultural conditions, settlement conditions, and factor endowments could affect early colonial structures so as to strengthen (or weaken) elites with repressive interests and capacities. Particularly where settlement conditions were difficult due to terrain or climate, or where plantation-style agriculture was most efficient, colonial conditions induced powerful, concentrated elites who had little need for either broad-based property rights or open opportunity societies. Those original conditions persist, or they induced equality-impeding institutions that persist to today. In other colonial settings, particularly where land, climate, and agriculture made European settlement easy and favored smaller, more widely distributed and often individually owned farms, colonization induced broad-based property rights, with weaker elites. These contrasting original settlement conditions then set the stage for equality-enhancing or equality-impeding institutions, which in turn affected property rights and capital markets over the long run. Analyses of the same general genre can be found in Boix (2003, pp. 45-46, 93) and Rodrik (1999) ; see also Olson (1984) . Land, agricultural conditions, and local economic strengths and weaknesses gave more power or less power to elites and nonelites and these have versus have-not differences shaped subsequent capital market and institutional development.
For Russia, Sonin (2003) and Hoff and Stiglitz (2008) analogously evaluate the political economy of the elites -there, the Russian "oligarchs." Property protection can be provided privately or publicly. The oligarchs were well positioned to protect their property from other less powerful private players, and accordingly opposed strong public protection of property rights. Adequately protected already, through their own means, they judged that publicly provided property protection would mostly facilitate competition from the less powerful, which could only hurt their own secure position. Hence, strong, general protection of property, financial and otherwise, did not arise, and financial markets did not develop. 4 This elite suppression of competition explanation is important, although incomplete, because the elites that can shut down local financial markets can presumably also shut down open-border trading markets. The explanation works well when trade barriers decline for an exogenous reason, such as European political goals of fostering a continent-wide economy in recent decades, in ways that overrode local interests. But these explanations work less well in other nations at other times, where exogenous shocks do not reduce trade barriers.
Moreover, in a democracy, one must explain why the democratic polity accedes to the elites' interests. A plausible starting point is that the elites' interests coincide with those of others, making a politically dominant coalition possible. A common example is that labor in the elites' industries also has reason to stifle product competition. The two may ally, with labor providing the democratic voting muscle, as Roe (2001 Roe ( , 2003 indicates. (Consideration of more complex coalitions comes later in this article.) For now, let us observe that movement to democracy, all else equal, should foster deeper capital markets, as elites have less weight in the nation's decision making and, hence, their goal of suppressing competitive upstarts will be harder to attain. However, all else will not be equal when an oligarchy becomes a democracy, as the elites would then have reason to form coalitions with broader voting groups, such as labor. Corporatism and varieties of capitalism, see Hall and Soskice (2001) , are related conceptualizations of a coalition of elites and similarly interested nonelites.
Nonelites' Interests
Nonelites in developing nations can affect property protection and capital markets. If they are living a subsistence life, then they can improve their immediate well-being by appropriating capital. If they have weak prospects or are currently calorie-deprived, their immediate survival considerations should trump long-run development goals. Their long run may be capital markets' short run. The have-nots can see property rights, such as investor protection, as protecting the haves. They could conclude that weaker investor protection would enable them to become the equivalent of squatters on the elites' financial assets.
Elites may want government protection against financial squatters, but their offsetting desire to suppress new competition may weaken their interest in greater property protection overall. The have-nots may want to protect their meager property, and a few of the upwardly mobile may think they could enter the elite. But most could conclude that investor protection protects the elites' capital from the have-nots' incursions and hence oppose strong property rights for capital. In such political environments financial markets and supporting institutions do not develop easily.
Political Stability
Roe and Siegel (2011) advance a complementary idea -that financial markets cannot develop easily in severely unstable political environments. As Huntington (1968, p. 8) observes, "authority has to exist before it can be limited, and it is authority that is in scarce supply in those modernizing countries where government is at the mercy of alienated intellectuals [and] rambunctious colonels." Roe and Siegel observe that political instability robustly explains differing levels of financial development, even after controlling for trade openness and the level of economic development -and does so in both country fixed effects and instrumental variable regressions, and across multiple measures of instability and financial development. In an unstable society, investors' basic property rights cannot be secure, because they cannot be sure what the polity will look like over the life of their investments.
Moreover, a political economy literature plants instability's roots in inequality-perpetuating institutions and ethnic fractionalization. 5 The first factor, economic inequality, fits tightly with explaining why investor protection does not develop in unstable environments: for the unstable polity to protect investors, it would have to protect the most favored elements in that polity. Haves versus have-nots again. Yet that unstable polity is riven by contention over the division of wealth and income -that is, whether the favored can keep their wealth. Roe and Siegel use proxies for inequality-perpetuating institutions and social fractionalization of the type that Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) brought forward and that Easterly (2007) validated, as further evidence of the old idea that inequality induces instability. A developing nation needs to break the negative causal chain of inequality leading to instability, which in turn leads to weak financial development, in order to position itself to develop its capital market.
Inequality
It bears emphasizing separately that inequality -haves and have-nots -is at the base of several of these theories. Severe inequality undermines political stability, and political stability is foundational for financial market development. Yet it may not be easy to reduce that inequality, not just for the obvious reason that those who lose from reducing inequality do not always support its reduction. Inequality may be due to the production technologies available in the economy; it may be endogenous to the polity itself. Yet several of the world's most developed financial markets are in nations, such as the United States, that have quite high Gini coefficients for the distribution of wealth and property. This characteristic deserves further inquiry.
Original Conditions
Path dependence could explain this outcome. The nation's income and wealth distribution may have been substantially equal when financial markets first developed, and then the nation accepted the inequality later. For the United States, such path dependence is plausible, as US income and property distribution until the end of the nineteenth century was relatively flat (Lindert 2006) . Financial markets started to develop during that era and persisted, without a major political upheaval pushing the country off that path. Preferences were not always procapital market, but they sought to channel and confine that market, not destroy it. Conversely, in countries that suffered a major political upheaval, the distribution of income and wealth during the period in which the capital market was reconstructed could have profoundly influenced its subsequent shape.
A similar sequential process holds true for England. England was the locus of the first Industrial Revolution: its severe labor shortage and its energy abundance pushed forward industrialization (Allen 2009) . Less well understood is that the higher wage rate that accompanied scarce labor also mitigated inequality in England, thereby fostering political stability, which created a favorable environment for capital market development. Engerman and Sokoloff (2002, pp. 44-46, 63-83) , as noted previously, offer a general structure of the political economy of property rights in the developing world, in which we can place rights in the capital market as a subset. If a colonizing power came to land areas best used for plantation-style crops or, say, mining activities using mass unskilled labor, then the original political institutions would reflect the underlying land use characteristics. The colonizers then had little reason to foster broad-based property rights, as they could protect themselves well enough. They had little reason to foster developing broad-based education and skills for their plantation workers, because the elites only needed unskilled labor. 6 The consequence is that the nation early on, while still a colony, lacked widely distributed property and had weak property protection institutions. Oppressive institutions persisted and capital markets had little role in future development. 
Conceptualizing Economic Inequality
A second characteristic is related but not identical. Politically destabilizing inequality may not be a function of the raw ratio of wealth and income of the richest to that of the poorest. Rather, it might be based on something more complex, which we can call a severity ratio. To construct the ratio, we look at the number of people unable to obtain, say, their 2000 calories per day. That is the denominator. The numerator counts those who have no difficulty obtaining the minimal calories for a comfortable existence (Williamson 2009 ).
In these terms, the United States is less severely unequal than the conventional Gini concept indicates -even the bottom fifth can usually get their 2000 calories per day. In another polity, where the bottom fifth struggles to obtain only 1500 calories per day, the reconceptualized severity ratio could be quite high, even though the usual Gini calculation would consider the nation to be more equal than the United States.
Mapping Inequality and Equality onto Race
Race, ethnicity, and religion can be central in a polity, particularly when wealth and income disparities cleave along racial or ethnic lines. If race and economic class map onto one another, it becomes easier for groups to demonize and dehumanize opposing groups and make a stable polity harder to achieve. Several studies have found such ethnic conflicts to be central to political instability.
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Race and ethnicity can have other effects that complicate analysis of their impact. They can make it easier for capital markets to flourish by diverting political conflict from economic to noneconomic issues, thereby pushing conflict between haves and have-nots lower on the political agenda. If the polity cleaves along cultural or multiple identity lines that do not map onto distributional differences, those distributional differences can recede in political contentiousness. Dahl (1971) , Benson (1961) , Sombart (1906) , and Schattsneider (1960) speak of this kind of issue.
Overall, though, instability increases if class and property-owning fault lines are also race and ethnicity fault lines. When they are, capital marketdebilitating conflict intensifies.
Contemporary and Historical Examples in the Developed World
In this section, I expand on several of the have versus have-not categories, with an eye on political economy configurations around the developed world in recent decades and further reference to the existing political economy of finance literature. For several of these examples, rational systemic optimization in a system of pre-existing institutions does not well explain the capital markets outcomes. Powerful preferences and compelling interests seem as important, or more important, as pre-existing institutions.
Contemporary
Labor in Europe
After World War II, labor was particularly powerful in Europe in ways that profoundly affected post-war capital market development. Capital market institutions were poorly supported, even decades after the war, in terms of budgets and personnel for the capital markets' regulatory apparatus (Jackson and Roe 2009) . Strong owners had two reasons to stay close to the firm, one to better ensure that the firm's cash flowed to them, the owners, and the other to be sure that the polity supported policies that would protect the firm's profitability. On the first, with labor able to make strong claims on firms' cash flows, owners had more reason to stay in place and run the firm themselves, or keep a controlling block of stock to facilitate keeping close watch on the managers. Owners had reason to stay involved to better ensure that managers resist powerful labor's strong claims on the firm's cash flow. On the second, strong owners had reason to influence the polity to keep the firm's market position dominant; in the weakened international trading markets after the war, labor and owners had reason to unite in this dimension to preserve their firm's market position, to keep out competition, and then to bargain to divide the spoils (Roe 2000 (Roe , 2001 (Roe , 2003 .
Managers in the United States
Managers in the United States -major American "haves" -are a powerful interest group in making the rules governing corporate finance and capital markets. In the 1980s, for example, capital markets created the hostile takeover to facilitate capital markets' control over managers. (As is well known, American diffuse ownership facilitated high levels of managerial agency costs, because managers lacked a day-to-day boss and often drifted from shareholders' interests with higher compensation, unnecessary expansion, and mistaken operating policies.) This technique had the outside firm or entrepreneur buying up enough stock of the target firm such that the new owner could direct managerial policy or replace the target firm's managers.
But the American "haves" -the managers and directors of large companies -successfully disrupted those hostile takeovers both transactionally and by using their political muscle. Transactionally, managers and directors developed poison pills and staggered boards that made it costly for the outsider to buy up the target company's stock. Politically, managers, through their lobbying organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce, the Business Roundtable, and, often enough, the business section of the American Bar Association, obtained favorable laws through the political process -laws that validated and often further impeded the hostile takeover.
Historical
American Populism: Have-nots versus the Powerful
Populism can affect financial markets and institutions. Andrew Jackson's destruction of the Second Bank of the United States in the 1830s is the most famous example in US history. It was a seminal event in American financial political history, leaving the United States without a truly national banking system until the latter part of the twentieth century. The effect of the Bank's demise was to make securities markets more vital for the United States and to deny the nation even the rudiments of a central bank until the beginning of the twentieth century (and perhaps not until the expansion of Federal Reserve authority in 1935). American capital markets could not develop via a nationwide banking system in the nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries. Roe (1994) attributes a significant fraction of the differences between American and many other nations' capital markets to the United States-specific aftermath of Jackson's veto, fueled by populist interests and thinking. Thereafter, institutions and new interests developed to accommodate and perpetuate the resulting weak national banking system. It could have gone the other way, as two early Congresses and two US presidents chartered the First and Second Banks, making the decision to have a quasi-central bank a closer one than some history books usually have it. The happenstance of political maneuvering derailed the American incipient central bank, as an ambitious Henry Clay mistakenly thought that early passage of a rechartering bill would put Jackson on the defensive, forcing him to approve it, while at the same time, the incumbent head of the Second Bank of the United States, Nicholas Biddle, proved to be politically clumsy. Clay underestimated both Jackson's resolve and the influence of smaller, weaker banks that preferred not to be challenged by the Second Bank's regulatory impulses. Jackson's veto and destruction of the Second Bank left the United States without a strong, national banking system and created the interests -small banks, scattered throughout the country -that deeply influenced financial market development in the country for the next century and a half.
Political economy and populist political impulses persisted, and institutions created by earlier preferences had staying power. After Jackson's destruction of the Second Bank, there were multiple efforts to facilitate a truly national banking system. However, these failed on the twin shoals of smaller banks' influence in Congress and populist resistance to a truly national banking system.
During the Civil War, for example, the United States built institutions called national banks, which substantively received their governing charter from Washington. But these banks were national in name only, as they were restricted to a single physical location. This limit was challenged in the 1890s, as the Treasury proposed to allow nationwide branching, but the proposal failed in Congress. It was challenged again in the 1920s and 1930s, but it was only mildly tweaked: until recent decades branching of banks was still limited to a single state at most and, for many states, a smaller geographic profile.
Popular animus continued to play a role in major banking and insurance legislation. Glass-Steagall's separation of investment and commercial banking, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 limits on bank activities (recall, for those familiar with the politicians of the time, Wright Patman's influence), and the major life insurance companies' lack of power to own common stock (due to the Armstrong investigation of 1906) can all be traced in major part to this popular animus. This left the United States with severe limits on national financial operations: a lack of a national banking system, banks without power to engage in commerce, and insurance companies without authority to own common stock. Although other nations have had some of these limits, few have had them all. Britain, for example, has had powerful insurers. Germany has had universal banks with substantial stock ownership and even more powerful control of their customers' votes. Japan has had nation-spanning banks with significant stock ownership.
German Codetermination
German codetermination is a formal institution reflecting this shareholder-social democratic balance of power, vividly illustrating the political economy effects on core corporate institutions. To settle raw political conflict at several moments in the twentieth century, German social democracy led to the Bundestag enacting laws mandating that labor be represented in firms' boardrooms, culminating in the 1976 law requiring near-parity representation for labor in the boardrooms of the nation's largest firms. Because unconstrained managers have tended to have an agenda favoring firm continuance, size, and risk avoidance (see Jensen 1986 ) and that agenda maps onto employees' own agenda for the same, an implicit coalition can easily form between managers and employees. When it does, shareholders will want to have a cohesive countercoalition in the boardroom. Concentrated ownership is a primary way to build that countercoalition.
Preference Aggregation and Combinatorics
Thus far I have generally examined discrete interests and their preferences for and against various capital markets forms. But, as the German codetermination experience shows, discrete interests can overlap and coalitions can arise. In this section, through a series of historical examples, I examine, first, how coalitions form, persist, and morph. Second, I examine the political institutions resulting from preference aggregation and how they shape political results and institutional formation, which in turn affect capital market results.
Shifting Coalitions
Banks and Labor in Europe
One of the more interesting instances of the formation of a capital marketaffecting coalition can be seen in post-World War II Western Europe. Perotti and von Thadden (2006) provide a compelling argument and significant data to support the idea that Western European polities in the post-World War II era had the equivalent of a banker-labor coalition that impeded capital market development. Their argument begins with the median voter theorem. In postwar Western Europe, they posit that the median voter had strong human capital but little financial capital. As such, the median voter had little interest in promoting financial markets, for fear that powerful financial markets would more readily erode his or her human capital than weak financial markets. Stronger capital markets punish slow-moving firms. They demand that firms more quickly adopt new technologies, if profitable, and those new technologies could readily erode the value of labor's human capital, tied as it is to experience with the old technologies. Lacking financial capital and dependent on human capital, the median voter was risk-averse to policies that could erode the voter's human capital.
9
At the same time, banks -to the extent that their creditors' interest dominated their other financial interests -were moderately risk-averse. This is because the downside disproportionately affected their loans, whereas the upside benefited stockholders. Accordingly, banks that became primary corporate governance players had a risk-averse profile that fit well with the median voter's preferences. Labor with limited capital preferred banks to stock markets -and that is what they sought from the polity and, powerful as they were, that is what they got from it. The median voter voted for bank-oriented capitalism. 10 9 It is also possible to recast the argument in property-owning terms. The relevant question would be whether the median voter owns property, not simply whether he or she owns financial property. If the median voter owns significant property -a house, a car -then he or she may support property rights generally, which include rights to financial property. 10 Or, analogously, their political parties made appropriate deals to support bank-oriented capitalism (Pagano and Volpin, 2005) . Moreover, if a decisive, median-voter middle class had seen its savings and wealth destroyed by the interwar inflation, it would plausibly put a premium on pension obligations guaranteed by the government. Then, as the government became the principal provider of pension and retirement funding, private pension funds, a major conduit for capital in the United States but not in Europe, would play a smaller role in that economy. See Perotti and Schwienbacher (2009) .
Managers, Labor, and Populism in the United States
A similar, although indirect, alignment of interests existed between American managers and American populism at several times. A plausible view of the sequential development of the history of US capital markets follows. In the 1890s, national enterprises became viable: railroads had by then spanned the North American continent, turning the nation into a single market, and engineering economies of scale made large-scale production especially valuable, inducing local firms to merge to form nation-spanning enterprises. With American populism having facilitated a weak national banking system, mergers needed stock market financing. With stock market financing in place, ownership started separating from control and managers increasingly gained control over the firm, with the stockholder-owners becoming geographically distant, poorly informed, and not motivated to control or even influence the firm's operations. Once ownership separated from control in the large American public firm, managers then became political players in their own right, via their lobbying organizations such as the Business Roundtable, the National Association of Manufacturers, and Chambers of Commerce. Their interest was to preserve and enhance managerial authority, which they have accomplished.
A similar American coalition formed in the 1980s. Hostile takeovers made managers' lives considerably more difficult during that decade. These takeovers also disrupted workers' expectations of their future in the firm by putting their jobs at risk. Even if a potential takeover would not leave the workers unemployed, the employees would find themselves in a disrupted work environment. Thus, they shared managers' opposition to hostile takeovers.
This kind of managerial-labor coalition was often enough decisive in pressing states to passing antitakeover laws. When a Pennsylvania corporation was targeted for a hostile takeover, it sought strong antitakeover law from the state legislature. For many Pennsylvania lawmakers, voting for the legislation was an easy political decision, as both the Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO supported the legislation. Roe (1993, p. 339 ) quotes a contemporary comment: "[The] lobbying effort is the product of teamwork between…Pennsylvania labor unions and a coalition of over two dozen corporations working for the passage of the bill under the well-organized direction of the Pennsylvania Chamber of Business and Industry."
Corporate-law constituency statutes, which in many states now allow boards to consider labor interests when deciding whether to support or oppose a takeover, are also manifestations of this coalition.
Dominant Stockholders and Labor
Dominant stockholders could ally with labor. As seen, business elites often have an interest in suppressing financial markets, as upstarts need access to capital to compete with incumbent elites, which they cannot get without strong financial markets. But this begs the question of why, in a democracy, the polity would accede to the elites' interests.
Mistake is one possibility. Ideology is another. A tactical coalition is a third. Labor at the incumbent firms may get a slice of the incumbent firms' profits, motivating labor at the business elites' firms to support the elites' interests in suppressing new competitors, because the elites' interests here coincide with their own. If labor obtains such a rent, it wants to suppress product market competition with their employer, suppress upstarts' access to new finance, and suppress open trade with foreign competitors.
A sophisticated rendition of the multiple possible coalitions can be found in Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) , who show how there are almost as many permutations in play between and among labor, owners, and managers as there are rich nations. Labor power can dominate owners and managers, as in Sweden. Or owners and managers can coalesce to dominate workers, as in Korea. Or owners can dominate both, as in oligarchic nations. Or workers and owners can coalesce to dominate managers. Or workers and managers can dominate owners, as in corporatist states, such as Germany, Japan, and The Netherlands.
Western European nations have been analyzed as corporatist systems for some time, with analysts viewing the economy as largely governed by tripartite decision makers: the government, peak labor associations, and employer representatives. The varieties of capitalism literature (Hall and Soskice 2001) integrated this thinking of the commonality of interests between employers and employees in some economies with specific production characteristics. That literature argues that economies that depend on skilled labor tend not to have liquid stock markets, which would disrupt labor skills. Conversely, economies that depend less on labor with firm-specific skills could handle capital markets' disruptions. These analyses look at the informal institutions of coalition formation. Business leaders would want to be represented at the centralized decision making institutions, thereby putting a thumb on the scale for close ownership and, hence, weaker capital markets as well.
Political Institutions and Preference Aggregation
Here I shift focus from how raw preferences and interests can shape institutions and financial markets to how the political economy of institutions shapes financial outcomes. Conceptually more traditional than the former, the political economy of institutional structure deserves to be applied to capital markets formation and merits summary and development here. Since Arrow's impossibility theorem, political scientists have examined mechanisms of preference aggregation in a polity, because these profoundly affect policy outcomes. As is well known, the impossibility theorem's conceptual power comes from voters having differently ordered preferences. When a choice between two of three viable options is presented, with the winner facing off against the third choice, the winning option may differ from what would result if the ordering of choices had been otherwise.
Parliamentary versus Presidential Systems: Proportional Representation and Party Lists
Pagano and Volpin (2005) apply Tabellini's (2000, 2005) general inquiry into parliamentary systems, proportional representation, and presidential systems to the specifics of corporate and capital markets. Party list and proportional representation enable a coalition among business owners and labor to enact rules that poorly protect capital providers (so that incumbent business owners benefit at the expense of outside investors) and protect incumbent labor well. Decisions are driven not by the median voter but by the way a dominant coalition is formed. Iversen and Soskice (2006) argue that proportional representation structures facilitate center-left redistributive coalitions, whereas majoritarian, presidential, first-past-the-post systems facilitate center-right, low redistribution outcomes. In majoritarian systems, they indicate, the decisive middle class vote will side with the well-to-do for fear of being taxed by the poor; but in proportional representation systems, the middle class can ally with the poor to redistribute from the well-to-do while still maintaining enough influence in the middle-poor coalition to ensure that the middle class are not themselves the target for redistribution.
Mueller (2006) shows further how first-past-the-post electoral systems, such as those in the United States, can affect corporate governance outcomes. In such political systems, a national interest group, such as labor, needs to persistently recapture a working majority in the legislature, working district by district, legislator by legislator. This is hard to accomplish. But in a party list system, the identity of the particular legislator is not vital to the interest group getting that legislator's vote: the legislator follows party discipline, thereby facilitating national deal making in which national labor institutions can be quite influential. In systems with first-past-the-post territorial elections, such national coalitions (and their concomitant influence) are harder to create and maintain. It is thus no accident that Tip O'Neill's famous aphorism -that all politics is local -came from a US national politician, the locally elected leader of the House of Representatives, a legislative body that is a collection of locally elected representatives who make national policy.
Mechanisms for preference aggregation can have a profound impact on the ability of players to form coalitions and, consequently, on the influence they can exert on the development of capital markets.
American Federalism I
The organization of the US Congress is relevant here in another dimension as well. If all politics (in the United States) is local, then local interests can determine national outcomes. One reason all politics is local is that the House of Representatives is organized by, and elected by, local, geographic districts. With representatives dependent on local interests for their election, the House was responsive historically to local bankers who wished to be shielded from out-ofdistrict competition. When technology only allowed for localized bricks-andmortar banking (i.e., before the era of automated teller machines, online banking, and cheap telecommunications), bankers had the means and motivation to influence their local representatives' voting on whether to facilitate nationwide bank branching, a result that we have seen deeply affected US capital markets. The state-by-state organization of the Senate presumably has had a similar, although weaker, impact.
Hence, one can see a structure-driven process: US political structure promoted local interests. When local banking was technologically possible, this local power overly emphasized local banking, making national banking markets impossible during the formative years of national industry. This meant that large industrial firms had to raise their capital from disparate sources that could not readily concentrate their stock holdings, facilitating a shift in authority inside the firm from financiers and owners to managers.
American Federalism II: Delaware
US corporate and capital markets law is made in two principal jurisdictions: Delaware (via the laws of corporate organization) and Washington, DC (via the laws covering securities regulation). Unlike other polities, the United States effectively allows the corporation to choose its own state of incorporation, regardless of where it does business in the nation; the corporation thus chooses its own governing law. Most major American public firms choose to incorporate in Delaware.
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The federal organization of US corporate lawmaking has long been a focus of corporate law academics, who have seen competition among states for corporate charters (and their resulting revenues) as a core driver in making corporate law, thereby applying Tiebout's (1956) insights on political jurisdictional mobility to the specifics of corporate lawmaking. Some thought the state-to-state competition was "to the top" in making corporate law more efficient, 12 whereas others saw that competition as one "to the bottom," by favoring the corporate players most central to the incorporation decisionmanagers, controlling shareholders, and their lawyers.
13
This federal organization of the polity can affect capital markets, as interests dominant on the state level can pass rules that a busy Congress might not provide. During the hostile takeover era, many states passed strong antitakeover laws, making it transactionally more expensive for an outsider to buy up stock of a public firm. In the political balance were the managerial, labor, and capital interests. Local managers did not want the hostile takeover to proceed. Local labor employed by the target company did not want the offer to proceed. While shareholders in the capital market presumably wanted the takeover to proceed, many of them were not local, because capital markets were national or international. Hence, the balance favored in-state managerial and labor interests over capital market interests.
14 Again, politics is (often enough) local.
American Federalism III: Delaware and Washington
The simultaneous state-federal structure of US corporate lawmaking can affect capital markets in another dimension. The interests that prevail in Delaware, the dominant state corporate lawmaker, are not the same as those making corporate and securities law in Washington. Particularly during times of financial crisis or scandal, the populist input to weaken shareholder and financial strength in the corporation, or to punish managers who are seen to be overcompensated, is strong in Washington and weaker in Delaware, where the interests of managers and shareholders dominate.
In areas that are of overlapping concern to national and Delaware lawmakers, the national and local polities interact in two major ways. First, Delaware may preemptively pass financial and corporate law to reduce the chance of federal action. It may do so out of self-preservation: if Delaware is far out of line with national sentiment, corporate lawmaking could move from Delaware to Washington and become, like securities law, national, congressionally made law.
12 Romano (1993 ), Winter (1977 . 13 Cary (1974 ), Bebchuk (1992 . Kahan and Kamar (2002) question the intensity of that state competition. 14 For example, Romano (1988) , Roe (1993 ), Miller (1998 .
Second, Delaware may act to protect its local interests: with first mover advantages, Delaware may pass rules that go some but not all of the way to satisfying the national appetite. Doing so would allow it to preserve as much autonomy for managers (or value for shareholders) as possible, by persuading Washington decision makers that enough had been done, so that nothing more is needed from Washington. Roe (2005) . This is analogous to the process Spiller and Gely (2008) posited for the Supreme Court, by which the Court often decides cases in ways that diminish the chance of congressional action (by coming closer to congressional preferences than they would have otherwise).
Weak Capital after World War II
Earlier in the article, I indicated that a defining feature of the political economy of US capital markets can be found in the destruction of the Second Bank of the United States, which left the country without a nationwide banking system during the nineteenth century, when a continent-wide, nationwide industrial economy arose. The interests, ideologies, and institutions that resulted tended to reinforce themselves during times of crisis, because no subsequent American crisis was so severe as to leave the economy flat, destroyed, and needing a fully new set of institutions. Even the 1930s New Deal tended to strengthen pre-existing interests, not destroy them.
Could there be a similar foundational political economy event for Western European and East Asian capital markets? I think there is, but as of now that possibility must be seen as a hypothesis, needing further theoretical and factual development.
I would hypothesize that after World War II political and economic institutions had been sufficiently destroyed in Europe that a substantial new construction of those institutions took place. In those years, capital owners and labor interests sought to establish the new rules of the game that would then govern markets and finance from that time on. The twist arises from the following difficulty: we know that the continental European rules of the game had a prolabor and not a pro-capital tilt in the subsequent decades. But with capital scarce after World War II -the physical capital was, after all, largely destroyed -and with labor (especially skilled labor) relatively abundant, the bargaining process in the economic arena should have favored the scarce resource's preferences in rules and returns. Yet at least as far as the rules were concerned, the results went the other way. Labor markets, including wage rates and other benefits, were favored in the decades after World War II.
When the bargaining began for a new postwar understanding as to how to organize capital and labor markets, the pro-capital markets players were relatively weak in the political arena -relative both to labor at the time and to their own more usual strength in influencing results. Their physical capital had largely been destroyed during the war; they had limited capacity to affect the politics of the time with campaign contributions, lobbying, or otherwise when the foundational deals were made. Only later could they afford the time, money, and personnel for such efforts; then they made sure that they were represented at the peak bargaining of the corporatist model. By that later time, however, labor had acquired its postwar favored status. For now, the original conditions idea -that the preferences and weak institutional structure in continental Europe right after World War II set the institutional framework for subsequent, relatively weak capital market development -is a hypothesis for further development. During the immediate postwar period, strongly held popular preferences and politically weak ownership interests could well have established the new institutional arrangements that would endure, affecting capital markets structure for decades.
Geopolitics
Geography and national political power influence political preferences and the strength and nature of internal political economy institutions. It is important to consider geopolitical features of the past half of the twentieth century, which can be quickly sketched out. Geopolitical features over time are more subtle, but can also be seen.
Countering the Soviet Union
The central geopolitical fact in continental Europe in the second half of the twentieth century was the looming presence of the Soviet Union. In the initial postwar elections, communist parties did quite well in France and Italy, making it important for centrist and conservative parties to co-opt the communist program, which they did. The result was policy that favored incumbent labor and that disfavored capital markets. One can think of the geopolitics as lying along a continuum: in Eastern Europe, communists gained power and capital markets ended. In Western Europe, to stave off communist power, the political center had to adopt some of the left's program. For Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, the relationship with China in the immediate postwar decades could well have brought similar domestic sensibilities into play.
European Geography over the Centuries
A widely held perception is that the state is stronger in Europe than in the United States. This view maps onto the view of state players as their own interest group that seeks to diminish the power of private capital markets, as outlined in the initial section of this article. The strength of the European states could have first originated in European geography: the open east-west plains of Europe meant that local security from invasion was always at issue, and that vulnerability induced national militaries and strong states (Roe 2007) . Postwar geopolitics reproduced the incentives for a strong state.
This geographic history contrasted with that of the United States and Britain historically, and with that of Europe today. The United States and Britain were both separated from invaders by bodies of water -narrow, but real, in Britain's case and wide for the United States. That geographic separation meant that centralized, standing armies were not needed for national security, and the state could be weaker than otherwise, thereby leaving space for private capital markets to develop. Today, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and a safer European geopolitical reality -one including European economic integration -the geopolitics of a centralized state for smaller European nations is historical, not current.
Political Change: Rightward and Leftward Shifts over Time
The postwar European setting leads to another consideration. One might examine the postwar left-right shifts for their impact on financial markets (see Roe 2003, Perotti and von Thadden 2006) . Left-right splits and the impact of shifts can be tested over time, but tests done thus far are not dispositive. That is, financial markets in the developed nations, especially in Europe, strengthened in the 1990s, even in nations with locally left-of-center governments. Several commentators have made much of this (see Botero et al. 2004) . This is an understandable misconception. The problem and its misconception can easily be conceptualized (and diagrammed, see Figure 2 ). Over time, the center of gravity in a polity can change, sometimes sharply. As an example, Tony Blair's election as UK prime minister in 1997 marked not the ascendancy of the hard left that long dominated the Labor Party, but the ascendancy of a moderate left as it tacked towards the center. Yet, thus far, in the usual academic studies it has been coded as the ascent of a left-of-center government. But capital markets may draw comfort from a tame left and flourish not because the left was in power but because the left had moved rightward. Brazil's experience with a market-friendly former union leader in the past decade also illustrates the phenomenon and potential for a left-right attribution error. Similarly, Bill Clinton's presidency represented a left-of-center shift for the United States, but that administration was as market-oriented as a right-tilting government in Western Europe in many eras. Indeed, in a pure median voter theory, the identity of the party in power makes no difference: it is the left-right location of the median voter that determines the polity's policies. Because some of the most substantial empirical work thus far on left-right influence on capital markets suffers from this misconception, more work must be done. Eichengreen (2007, p. 333) explains why a left-of-center government can enact reforms that, in a prior decade, only a right-of-center government would have considered: "The German chancellor Gerhard Schröder's Agenda 2010 of labor-market reforms was motivated, in part, by the specter of German manufacturing moving east if steps were not taken to reduce labor costs." 16 7
Indeterminacy, Overgeneralization, and Local Variation
Two characteristics can undermine the influence of the academic agenda of political economy for understanding capital markets. First, although politics may well be decisive in determining capital markets' shape and extent, too many political explanations are local: a particular coalition in this nation, the happenstance of deal making in that nation. A narrative of national financial 16 The rents-oriented version of the social democratic theory helps explain Eichengreen's observation. Let us posit, again, that rents to labor and owners in key industries help fuel the social democratic conventions that demean capital markets, whose corrosive effects would erode rents to elites (see Rajan and Zingales 2003a) and to the favored labor sectors that induce social democratic governments to oppose capital market development (see Roe 2001 Roe , 2003 . As the rents erode, labor and its allies have fewer reasons to be wary of capital market development. Hence, their preferred policies would change. Preferences and institutions interact. For example, many British corporate institutions developed early in the twentieth century (Franks et al. 2009 ) when Britain was a conservative polity. These institutions could have persisted, even when the polity moved leftward. The polity might not have allowed those institutions to arise in that era, but the extant interests (and institutions) could have been strong enough to resist severe destruction.
legislation may reveal the likely political economy story for that piece of legislation, but the explanation may not test well, because a testable characteristic may not repeat in a sufficient number of nations to yield significant regression results. Consequently, only the most general of political economy theories may be susceptible to strong empirical analysis. National case studies could be how we see what explains capital markets' depth (or lack of it).
A second problem afflicts a political economy approach. Often underlying our analysis is the goal of finding out what works for policy and recommending that policy's adoption. If we can find a simple rule or two that helps capital markets, or an existing rule that hinders them without ancillary benefit, then we can recommend which rules should be adopted and which should not. But a political economy analysis does not yield such strong, precise, normative results for us. National politics is hard enough to understand, much less to influence with academic work.
But understanding the political economy inputs is still vital to normative analysis. If there is a menu of improvements for financial markets, but some choices on that menu will encounter political economy problems and others will not, then policy makers should order their preferences accordingly, picking perhaps a less efficient but politically viable policy. International aid agencies may be particularly susceptible to ignoring political economy influences because they see their seeking political influence as illegitimate. But if the earlier focus on the centrality of political instability is correct, the development agencies can use the resulting insights to better decide how to allocate their aid and advice. Highly unstable polities are unlikely to benefit from even good rules; attempts to graft institutions for finance into such polities will be unlikely to "take." Hence, the development agencies can channel their efforts into nations that already have sufficient stability to allow for success. They can also select from among the different capital markets' development policies, choosing those that are more likely to stabilize than destabilize the polity, presumably keeping distributional outcomes in mind.
Conclusion
Two fundamental fractures can cripple the politics of capitalism and capital markets. One is the contest between the haves and the have-nots. Have-nots can conclude that they gain too little from capitalism, so they may expropriate capital from the haves. Capitalism may persist in form, but its productivity would be demolished, as savers will not save -that is, will not create capital -because in such polities, owners of physical and financial capital do not see their capital as safe. Instead, they will consume it, for if they do not, the have-nots will appropriate it. Alternatively, the haves may capture political institutions themselves and seek to put in place institutions that redistribute value to themselves. Due to that tension, capitalist institutions may not survive or, even if they do survive, would fail to provide prosperity. The second problem cuts the polity along another dimension. The capitalist haves may split and contest the polity among themselves. Those haves who have captured political institutions may seek to redistribute value away from other haves. The winners obtain rules that further their wealth and their preferred capital market channel. With enhanced wealth, they have both the strength and the motivation to preserve their position and suppress competitive upstarts. If the institutions are roughly democratic, the haves will find it valuable, and often necessary, to form alliances with have-not voting masses, presumably starting with labor from their own industry.
These two problems arise in multiple dimensions in the economy, affecting welfare and social payments, antitrust policy, taxation, corporate law, income distribution, and financial markets. Many seemingly smaller problems in implementation of rules and laws are local manifestations of one of these two problems. For the most part, I have analyzed these two basic problems in the politics of capitalism in terms of how they specifically affect financial markets and corporate structures. The issues may be more general.
The political problem of capitalism is to find institutions and preference distributions that keep the extent of such fissures and their costs low. No country succeeds in getting them to zero. Much that seems superficially inefficient to an economics-oriented analyst is a polity's effort to keep these fissures from rupturing the terrain.
We have made much headway in the past few decades, since North's (1990) focus on institutions, in understanding how institutions persist through time. Institutions, though, are created at some point in time. Similarly, institutions are sometimes torn down, radically reconstructed, or even replaced. People and polities with preferences and interests create them, change them, and at times destroy them. Sometimes longstanding institutions can withstand a tidal wave from current preferences; at other times they cannot, and new, widespread, powerful preferences create new institutions that endure thereafter. Sometimes today's result can be predicted from the pre-existing institutional framework; at other times current preferences that emerge during an economic or political crisis determine today's result. The political economy of capital markets well illustrates this interaction between preferences and institutions. Only when we understand how preferences for and against capital markets interact with institutions in the political economy will we understand the shape and extent of the capital market. Today's preferences, when effective and dominant in the political arena, can become tomorrow's governing institutions. In this article, I have focused on how preferences can overwhelm pre-existing institutions and establish new ones that support, channel, or determine the strength, nature, and quality of capital markets.
